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Internet Retailers and
Intertype Competition: How the
Supreme Court's Incomplete Analysis
in Leegin v. PSKS Leaves
Lower Courts Improperly Equipped
to Consider Modern Resale Price
Maintenance Agreements
ABSTRACT

In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the
U.S. Supreme Court held that resale price maintenance (RPM)
agreements are to be judged under the rule of reason. An RPM
agreement is an agreement between a manufacturer and retailers
stipulating that retailers will charge a certain price for the
manufacturer's products. This Note argues that the Supreme Court
should have instructed lower courts to consider intertype competition in
addition to interbrand and intrabrandcompetition when evaluating
RPM agreements under the rule of reason. Two reasons lead to this
conclusion. First, the Internet has invigorated intertype competition
and has made it an important competitive force in the economy. Resale
price maintenance agreements have the potential to harm intertype
competition; therefore, courts should consider intertype competition
when applying the rule of reason. Second, the growth of online
retailing has challenged the traditional rationales for RPM
agreements. Online retailers may not react to an RPM agreement in
the same way as traditional retailers, and the existence of online
retailersnow makes it more difficult for courts to determine whether an
RPM agreement is necessary for a manufacturer to prevent free riding.
If courts would consider intertype competition when applying the rule
of reason, they would more accurately and fairly assess the competitive
effects of these agreements.
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In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled nearly a century of
precedent and changed antitrust law dramatically when it issued its
opinion in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.1 The
controversial five-to-four decision may affect many Internet retailers.
Leegin held that courts must apply the rule of reason when evaluating
resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements. 2 The effect of this
holding is quite simple: manufacturers, in most instances, may now
legally require retailers to charge manufacturer- suggested retail
For nearly one hundred years prior to Leegin, RPM
prices. 3
agreements and policies were illegal per se under Section 1 of the
4
Sherman Act.
Whether or not RPM agreements are legal is an important
question to society in general-and to online retailers in particularbecause these agreements can stifle online retailers' ability to compete
in and enter new markets. 5 Internet retailers often compete against
traditional, brick-and-mortar retailers by offering lower prices and
providing different shopping experiences for consumers.6 Competition

1.
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
2.
Id. at 2725; see also Ashley Doty, Note, Leegin v. PSKS: New Standard, New
Challenges, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 655 (2008) (thoroughly discussing Leegin).

See Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
3.
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) ("[I]n practice, [the rule
of reason] is little more than a euphemism for nonliability.").
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Note, Leegin's
4.
Unexplored "Change in Circumstance"."The Internet and Resale Price Maintenance, 121
HARv. L. REV. 1600 (2008) (providing an excellent discussion of Leegin vis-a-vis the
Internet).
See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
5.
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 289-90, 302-03, 317-27 (2000).

6.

See Mary Wolfinbarger & Mary C. Gilly, Shopping Online for Freedom, Control

and Fun, 43-2 CAL. MGMT. REV. 34, 34-36 (describing how consumers' goals and

experiences shopping online will affect the amount that they choose to spend online or in
other environments); see also Erich M. Fabricius, Recent Development, The Death of
Discount Online Retailing? Resale Price MaintenanceAfter Leegin v. PSKS, 9 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 87 (2007) (providing an informative discussion of Leegin and noting the growth of
online retailing in recent years).
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among different types of retailers selling similar products is known as
7
intertype competition.
Other unique types of firms such as mail-order-catalog firms
and factory-outlet stores generate intertype competition as well, but
the Internet has done much more to make intertype competition a
robust competitive force.8 Online sales have grown at a rate of 25
percent over the last 5 years, and reached over 100 billion dollars in
2006. 9 Internet retailers often challenge brick-and-mortar firms by
charging lower prices. 10 They also challenge traditional firms by
providing consumers with the ability to browse products and make
purchases from home, which is often more convenient for consumers."
In Leegin, the Supreme Court held that the rule of reason
applies to RPM agreements, effectively legalizing these agreements in
many, if not most, cases. 12 The rule of reason is a case-by-case
analytical approach that requires courts to examine a number of
factors in order to determine whether a challenged business practice
violates the Sherman Act. 13 After Leegin, when applying the rule of
reason to RPM agreements, courts will now generally look to whether
the agreement was put in place to encourage retailers to provide
adequate point-of-sale services or to prevent free riding. 14 The Leegin
Court argued that RPM can often be beneficial for these very
reasons.15
These traditional justifications for RPM agreements-that they
induce retailers to provide point-of-sale services and eliminate free
16
riding-focus on both interbrand and intrabrand competition.
7.
Chip E. Miller, James Reardon & Denny E. McCorckle, The Effects of
Competition on Retail Structure: An Examination of Intratype, Intertype, and Intercatagory
Competition, 63 J. MARKETING 107, 107 (1999).
8.
See infra text accompanying notes 135-59 (demonstrating that the Internet has
invigorated intertype competition).
9.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATs 3 (2008), available at http://www.census.gov

/eos/www/2006/2006reportfinal.pdf.
10.
See Note, supra note 4, at 1613-15 (noting that prices at purely online retailers
tend to be lower than Internet prices available at retailer using both online and traditional
retail formats). At least one study has found that 26.4% of consumers visited brick-andmortar stores before completing their online purchase. Id. at 1616.
11.
See Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 42-43.
12.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2007);
see also Posner, supra note 3, at 14 (explaining that the rule of reason is a euphemism for
legality).
13.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2726 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the rule of reason).
14.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (discussing how resale price maintenance can
be used in ways that do not threaten competition and may indeed be good for competition).
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 2715 (explaining resale price maintenance in terms of interbrand and
intrabrand competition).
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Interbrand competition is competition among different brands, while
intrabrand competition is competition between different entities
selling the same brand. 17 In Leegin, the Court found that RPM
increases interbrand competition, and therefore makes markets more
competitive generally.' 8 The Court, however, did not give adequate
consideration to the way in which RPM agreements can reduce
competition by negatively impacting intertype competition. 19
Moreover, the traditional justifications for RPM-which center
conceptually on interbrand and intrabrand competition 2 0 -do not
adequately capture changes in the marketplace brought about by the
21
Internet.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should have
instructed lower courts to also consider intertype competition when
applying the rule of reason to RPM agreements. Courts should
consider the effect that an RPM agreement has on intertype
competition because these agreements can often harm intertype
By
competition, which may lead to less competition generally.
considering intertype competition along with interbrand and
intrabrand competition, courts will be able to more accurately
evaluate RPM agreements in light of marketplace changes created by
Internet commerce.
Section I provides background information on RPM agreements
and a brief overview of the Supreme Court's treatment of RPM from
22
its 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park and Sons Co.
Section II discusses intertype
to its Leegin decision in 2007.
competition, explaining how the Internet has made it more important,
and argues that the Supreme Court should have instructed lower
courts to consider intertype competition when evaluating RPM
agreements under the rule of reason. Section III concludes the Note
with a summary of the argument.

17.
ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KovAcIc & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 340-41 (2002).
18.
19.
20.

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-69.
See GAVIL, KOvACIC & BAKER, supra note 17, at 340-42

(explaining the

difference between "interbrand" and "intrabrand" competition).
21.
See infra text accompanying notes 199-208 (arguing that intertype competition
along with interbrand and intrabrand competition more accurately describe the
marketplace).
220 U.S. 373, 407-09 (1911).
22.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Resale Price MaintenanceAgreements and
Their UnderlyingPolicies
Resale price maintenance is a type of vertical-distribution
restraint.2 3 A vertical restraint involves entities at different levels in
a supply chain, such as manufacturers and retailers, as opposed to a
horizontal restraint, which involves competitors at the same level,
such as different retailers. 24 Resale price maintenance is a practice in
which upstream distributors (often manufacturers) enter into
agreements with downstream dealers (often retailers) that specify
prices at which products must be sold. 25 Common reasons why
manufacturers might want to implement an RPM policy include the
desire to encourage retailers to offer high-quality point-of-sale
services, such as a friendly and knowledgeable sales staff, nice
showrooms, or better warranties. 26 Manufacturers also might want to
use RPM policies to prevent free riding or to promote a high-end brand
27
image.
B. Rule of Reason and Per Se Illegality
In 1890 Congress passed the federal antitrust statute popularly
known as the Sherman Act. Section 1 of the Sherman Act imposes
civil and criminal liability on every person making a "contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." 28 The Supreme
Court developed two general rules for determining whether a business
practice violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act: the per se rule and the
rule of reason. 29 The circumstances in which courts apply the rule of

23.

GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 17, at 340.

24.

Id.

25.
Id. at 374 ("If minimum resale price maintenance is permitted, the
manufacturer may write a contract with the retailer that sets the price at which the
retailer re-sells its [merchandise] to consumers.").
26.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-17
(2007).

27.

Id.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2007).
28.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712-13, 2720 (discussing the per se rule and rule of
29.
reason in the context of vertical restraints); see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at
167 (providing background information on the per se rule and rule of reason).
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reason and the per se rule have changed since the time that the
30
Sherman Act was enacted.
1. Rule of Reason
The rule of reason is a circumstance-specific, case-by-case
approach to determining whether a business practice is an
31
unreasonable restraint on trade and thus violates the Sherman Act.
The rule of reason is the prevailing standard by which business
practices are judged.3 2 In applying the rule of reason, courts weigh a
number of factors 'including specific information about the
business' and 'the restraint's history, nature, and effect."' 33 A classic
formulation of the rule of reason was set forth in Board of Trade of
Chicago v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the34particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.

The rule of reason has been criticized for being too vague, leaving
courts and society with little guidance for determining when business
35
practices adjudicated under the rule of reason will be deemed illegal.
It is often expensive and difficult for plaintiffs to prove violations of
the rule of reason, which has led some commentators to conclude that

30.

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 167-68. Compare Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.

John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-09 (1911) (holding resale price maintenance
agreements are illegal), and Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2709-10 (overruling Dr. Miles and holding
that resale price maintenance agreements are judged under the rule of reason), with
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967) (holding that
intrabrand, non-price restraints are per se illegal) and Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (overruling Arnold and holding that intrabrand non-price
restraints are judged under the rule of reason).
31.
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (stating that
courts applying the rule of reason should "consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied").
32.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 ('The rule of reason is the accepted standard for
testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of [the Sherman Act].").
Id. (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
33.
34.
246 U.S. at 238.
Posner, supra note 3, at 14 ("The content of the rule of reason is largely
35.
unknown; in practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability."); Note, supra
note 4, at 1620 (explaining how the rule of reason is unpredictable, which is particularly
problematic for businesses who must rely on this rule).
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business practices that are judged under the rule of reason are
36
essentially legal.
2. Per Se Rule
In contrast to the rule of reason, some business practices have
been found to be so harmful to competition that they warrant per se
condemnation under the Sherman Act. 37 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that horizontal agreements among competitors to fix
prices, such as cartel agreements, are per se illegal under the
Sherman Act. 38 When courts apply the per se rule, they do not
examine if the business practice may be beneficial in some way;
instead, they simply condemn the practice as a violation of the
39
antitrust laws.
C. Dr. Miles Holds that Resale Price MaintenanceAgreements
Are Per Se Illegal
In 1911 the Supreme Court, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., addressed whether a manufacturer could impose
40
an RPM policy on retailers and wholesalers that sold its products.
The plaintiff company, Dr. Miles, sold "proprietary medicines,
prepared by means of secret methods and formulas," 4 1 and specified
prices at which retailers and wholesalers were required to sell its
products. 42 Upon learning that a wholesaler had refused to adhere to
its pricing policy, Dr. Miles sued, claiming that that by selling its
products using a "cutrate" or "cut-price system," the wholesaler had
43
damaged the company's reputation.

Note, supra note 4, at 1620 (explaining that in the resale price maintenance
36.
context the rule of reason amounts to per se legality and that few private plaintiffs bring

suit under this rule because of the high cost).
37.

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 167-68.

GAVIL, KovAcic & BAKER, supra note 17, at 95 (explaining that once price
38.
fixing is found, a per se rule applies); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 168 (noting
that naked price fixing among competitors remains per se illegal).
GAVIL, KovAcIc & BAKER, supra note 17, at 95-96 (explaining that the per se
39.
rule precludes all attempts to demonstrate "reasonableness").
220 U.S. 373, 374-75 (1911).
40.
Id. at 374. Dr. Miles produced products such as "Dr. Miles' Nervine," a tonic for
41.
treating nervous disorders such as "sleeplessness, hysteria, headache, neuralgia, backache,
pain, epilepsy, spasms, fits, and St. Vitus' dance," as well as Alka-Seltzer. Id. In 1979 Dr.
Miles was bought out by Bayer AG. Id.
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 374.
42.
Id. at 374-75.
43.
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The Supreme Court held that the RPM agreement that Dr.
Miles sought to enforce was unlawful for two reasons. First, the Court
held that such agreements were unenforceable as a matter of property
law based on the ancient common-law doctrine of restraints on
alienation. 44 Thus, the Court concluded that RPM agreements were
not only unenforceable but also illegal. 45 Furthermore, underlying the
Court's analysis was the belief that RPM agreements were equivalent
to agreements among competitors to fix prices, 46 and constituted a
practice that clearly harmed competition.4 7
It was this second
rationale that the Court would later focus on and reject in Leegin.48
Although the Court in Dr. Miles did not explicitly state that
RPM agreements were per se illegal under the Sherman Act, courts
and commentators after Dr. Miles interpreted the opinion to mean just
that. 49 Notably absent from the Court's opinion was any serious
consideration of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of
50
RPM agreements.
D. The Supreme Court's Approach to Vertical Restraints
Ebbs and Flows
Between the 1940s and 1970s, application of the per se rule
characterized the Supreme Court's approach to analyzing the legality
of vertical agreements under the Sherman Act. 51 By 1967 most
vertical agreements regarding price and non-price competition were
determined to be per se illegal. 52 However, in 1977 the Court's
philosophy toward antitrust law began to change, and its approach to
vertical restraints ebbed away from the per se rule and toward the

44.
Id. at 404-05; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2705, 2714 (2007) ("By relying on the common-law rule against restraints on alienation,
the [Dr. Miles] Court justified its decision based on 'formalistic' legal doctrine .
(citations omitted)).
45.
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408-09.

46.

Id.

47.
Id.; see also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 168-69 (discussing how cartel
agreements, among other things, reduce output, transfer wealth from consumers to the
cartel, dampen entry opportunities, and discourage innovation).
48.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714 (noting that later courts rejected the assumption
made by the Dr. Miles Court that vertical agreements had the same negative effect on
competition as horizontal agreements among competitors).
49.
Id. at 2713. ('The Court has interpreted Dr. Miles as establishing a per se rule
against [resale price maintenance agreements]." (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)).
50.
Compare Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408-09, with Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-58 (1977).
51.
GAVIL, KovAcIc & BAKER, supra note 17, at 350.

52.

Id.
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rule of reason. 53 That year, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., the Court held that the rule of reason applied to a manufacturer's
54
attempt to geographically restrict where retailers sold its products.
In Sylvania, a television-set manufacturer had a policy of
limiting the geographic territories in which its franchisees could sell
its products. 55
The manufacturer's goal was to attract "more
aggressive and competent retailers" by insulating the retailers from
competition among themselves. 56 The Sylvania Court declared that a
"departure from the rule of reason" must be based on "demonstrable
economic effect." 57 It concluded that the geographical restrictions
imposed by the manufacturer benefited competition by encouraging
retailers to "engage in promotional activities or to provide service and
repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of [the
manufacturer's] products."5 8
The Court found that territorial
restrictions actually increased interbrand competition, as retailers
would begin competing based on non-price attributes that would make
59
the manufacturer's brand more competitive as to other brands.
In many respects, the territorial restraints at issue in Sylvania
were similar to RPM agreements; however, Sylvania did not overrule
Dr. Miles.60 The Court justified its decision not to reconsider the
legality of RPM agreements in a footnote, simply stating that "[t]he
per se illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for
many years and involves significantly different questions of analysis
and policy." 61 Justice White noted in his concurring opinion that the
majority's emphasis on analyzing demonstrated economic effects made
it hard to justify a continuing belief in the per se illegality of RPM
under Dr. Miles. 62 Justice White pointed out that the procompetitive
effects by which the majority justified applying the rule of reason in
Sylvania would likely apply to RPM agreements. 63 Consequently, he
argued, "[tihe effect, if not the intention, of the Court's opinion is
necessarily to call into question the firmly established per se rule
64
against price restraints" established by Dr. Miles.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 319.
433 U.S. 36, 38-39, 59 (1977).
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 55.
Id.
See id. at 52 n.18.
Id.
Id. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 70.
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Sylvania ushered in a new era of antitrust jurisprudence as the
Supreme Court began to embrace the Chicago school of economics'
vision of antitrust law. 65 The Chicago school emphasizes the power of
66 It
free markets to reach outcomes that maximize consumer welfare.
advocates regulation only when necessary to prevent businesses from
restraining trade in ways that reduce output and raise prices. 67
Sylvania made clear that the principal goal of antitrust law is
68
to promote and preserve economically efficient business practices.
Doctrinally, the decision positioned the rule of reason as the Sherman
Act's "guiding force." 69 After Sylvania, the Court systematically
overruled many of its precedents that had applied the per se rule,
relying on economic theory in its interpretation and application of the
Sherman Act. 70
E. The TraditionalEconomic JustificationsFor and Against
Resale Price Maintenance
Resale price maintenance agreements have the potential to
benefit or harm competition depending on the circumstances in which
they are employed. 71 It was not until years after Dr. Miles was
decided, however, that economists, scholars, and judges fully accepted
72
the procompetitive rationales for RPM.

65.
Lino A. Graglia, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The
Strange Career of the Law of Resale Price Maintenance 20-22 (U. Tex. Sch. L. L. & Econ.
Research, Research Paper No. 115, 2007).
66.
Id. at 22.
67.
Id.
68.
GAVIL, KovAcIc & BAKER, supra note 17, at 358; see Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 5859.
69.
GAVIL, KovAcIc & BAKER, supra note 17, at 358; see Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 5859 ("departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable
economic effect...").
70.
GAVIL, KovAcic & BAKER, supra note 17, at 358; see, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding that maximum resale price maintenance is to be judged
under the rule of reason).
71.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-17
(2007) (discussing how resale price maintenance can create procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects depending on the circumstances); see generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
442-56 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST].
72.
See Posner, supra note 3, at 3-4. Judge Posner pointed out that by the time
Sylvania was decided, the prevailing view of vertical restraints had changed and courts
were more willing to accept the procompetitive rationales used to justify resale price
maintenance. Id.
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1. Possible Procompetitive Effects
Resale price maintenance agreements limit competition among
a manufacturer's retailers (intrabrand competition) but increase
73
competition among brands (interbrand competition).
a. Resale Price Maintenance Policies Can Induce Retailers To
Provide the Services and Amenities that Customers Value
Manufacturers can use RPM policies to induce retailers to
provide point-of-sale services that consumers value.7 4 This practice, in
theory, increases interbrand competition.7 5 When a manufacturer
imposes an RPM agreement, it eliminates price competition among its
retailers. 76 In order to attract customers, retailers will compete with
one another by seeking to provide superior point-of-sale services, such
77
as better showrooms or warranties.
Assuming that consumers value these additional point-of-sale
services, consumers will demand more of the product, and the demand
curve will shift upward.7 8 This increase in demand offsets what would
otherwise be a reduction in sales as a result of the uniformly higher,
manufacturer-mandated price of the product. 79 In this scenario, the
amount that a retailer will invest to provide point-of-sale services
equals the difference between the retailer's marginal cost and the
price under the RPM agreement.8 0 Manufacturers benefit from the
RPM policy because demand for their products increases and the
point-of-sale services make their brands more competitive with other
brands.8 1 Resale price maintenance, therefore, increases interbrand
competition by making a manufacturer's brand more competitive in
82
relation to other brands.

73.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715 (noting that minimum resale price agreements can
increase interbrand competition by reducing intrabrand competition).
74.
Id. at 2715-16; STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 380-84

(6th ed. 2005).
75.
See LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381.
76.
Id; see also Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2716 ("With price competition decreased, the
manufacturer's retailers compete among themselves over services.").
77.
See LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.; see Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715 (discussing how resale price maintenance
increases interbrand competition).
80.
LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381 exhibit 11.4 (illustrating and explaining the
cost that retailers will incur to provide point-of-sale services).
81.
See id.; see also HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 455-56
(providing a more detailed discussion of this principle).
82.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16.

LEEGIN V. PSKS

2009]

b. Resale Price Maintenance Policies Can Prevent Free Riding
Resale price maintenance agreements can also induce retailers
to offer more point-of-sale services by eliminating free riding.8 3 Free
riding occurs when customers visit a retailer with a nice showroom
and friendly sales staff in order to learn about a product, but then go
to a no-frills retailer to make a purchase at a lower price.8 4 Because of
this consumer behavior, retailers may be deterred from investing
enough in point-of-sale services out of fear that their rivals will free
ride off of their superior services.8 5 If point-of-sale services are not
offered, however, the overall demand for the manufacturer's product
may decrease.8 6 In such cases, manufacturers will want to eliminate
free riding and can use RPM agreements to ensure that free riding
does not discourage retailers from providing the necessary point-of87
sale services that many customers desire.
2. Possible Anticompetitive Effects of Resale Price Maintenance
Depending on the circumstances, RPM agreements can be used
in anticompetitive ways. Manufacturers or retailers can use RPM
agreements, in some circumstances, to organize and police cartel
agreements.8 8 In addition, a dominant retailer could use an RPM
policy to forestall innovation in the distribution channel.8 9
a. Resale Price MaintenanceMay Be Used to Enforce Manufactureror
Retailer Cartel Agreements
Both manufacturers and retailers can use RPM agreements to
police a cartel agreement. 90 In a situation where retailers have agreed
to fix prices, they could coerce a manufacturer into implementing such

83.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450-53; see also
LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 380-81 (providing a hypothetical explanation of the freerider problem).
84.
LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 380 (explaining free riding in the context of
consumer electronics); see also HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450-53
(explaining free riding).
85.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450; LANDSBURG, supra
note 74, at 380-81.
86.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450.
87.
Id. at 450-53.

88.

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-

18 (2007); HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 443-48.
89.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717; HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at
448.
90.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 443-48.
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an agreement in order to ensure that all retailers are adhering to the
cartel's price. 9 ' Manufacturers, however, do not benefit from retailer
cartels, and would have an incentive to resist imposing a resale price
agreement in order to help support such a cartel. 92 Moreover, retailer
markup is, in essence, the cost a manufacturer pays to have its
products distributed; naturally, a manufacturer wants to keep this
93
cost as low as possible.
In some instances, manufacturers could use an RPM
agreement to shore up a manufacturer's cartel. 94 Manufacturers could
use this type of agreement to monitor prices at the retail level to
95
ensure that no member of the cartel cheats on the agreement.
Regardless of whether the RPM agreement is being used to support a
retailer or manufacturer cartel, a sufficient number of manufacturers
would have to be involved in order for it to be profitable; otherwise
96
consumers would switch to lower-priced brands.
b. Resale Price Maintenance May Be Used By a Dominant Retailer to
ForestallInnovation in the DistributionChannel
Resale price maintenance agreements may also be used when a
large retailer seeks to preserve its lion's share of the market by
forestalling innovation in the distribution channel. 9 7 A dominant
retailer may use its buying power to coerce a manufacturer into
imposing an RPM policy in order to prevent firms who have lower
costs from entering the market and undercutting its prices. 98 In such
cases, the dominant retailer may not only restrain competition by
lower-cost firms, but it may also forestall innovation in the
distribution channel because firms will not have an incentive to design
innovative business models that allow them to offer a lower price. 99
For instance, firms like online retailers that generally have lower
costs may be deterred from entering the market if they know they

91.
Id. at 445-47.
92.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718-19 (explaining how the interests of manufacturers
and consumers are generally aligned with respect to retailer profit margins).
93.
Id. at 2718.
94.
Id. at 2717; HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 447-48.
95.
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 447-48.
96.
Id.; see Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717, 2719.
97.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717, 2719.
98.
Id.
99.
See id.
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cannot gain market share by undercutting the incumbent firm's
price.1 00
F. The Supreme Court's Decision in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.
Leegin Creative Leather Products designed, distributed, and
manufactured leather products, including women's belts and
accessories. 10 1 It did so under the Brighton brand name. 10 2 In 1997
Leegin instituted two promotion policies under which it refused to sell
its products to retailers who failed to adhere to the suggested retail
prices-in essence, this was an RPM policy.'0 3 Leegin hoped this
would incentivize smaller retailers-which Leegin believed provided
better service-to carry its products since it thought that large
department stores like Macy's, Bloomingdales, and May Co. did not
provide, adequate services and product support. 104
Kay's Kloset was a retailer who sold Leegin's products and who
participated in its RPM program. 10 5 Leegin learned, however, that
Kay's had been marking down Brighton's entire product line by 20
percent.106 (Leegin also came to believe that Kay's stores were not
attractive enough.)10 7 Leegin requested Kay's to stop marking down
Brighton products, but Kay's refused. 0 8 After Leegin stopped selling
Brighton products to Kay's, Kay's sued in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, alleging that Leegin violated
the antitrust laws by entering into RPM agreements with its
retailers. 10 9 The district court found that the per se rule applied and
entered a judgment in Kay's favor. 10 The Fifth Circuit affirmed."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
RPM agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful or

100.
Id. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that resale price maintenance can
make "it more difficult for price-cutting competitors (perhaps Internet retailers) to obtain
market share"); see Fabricius, supra note 6, at 103 (noting how online retailers may have
lower overhead costs and greater efficiency).
101.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 2711.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 2712.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
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should be judged under the rule of reason. 112 Writing for the majority,
Justice Kennedy reiterated Sylvania's holding that the rule of reason
is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade
in violation of the Sherman Act. 113 He explained that Dr. Miles was
based on faulty reasoning because of its unfounded reliance on
property law as well as its mistaken assumption that vertical
agreements between manufacturers and retailers are analogous to a
horizontal agreement between competitors. 11 4
Justice Kennedy
explained that cases since Dr. Miles had called into question whether
RPM agreements should remain per se illegal. 115 Under these cases,
practices that restrained trade could only be held per se illegal if they
"would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output."'116 To justify a per se rule, Justice Kennedy wrote
17
that a restraint must have "manifestly anticompetitive" effects."
In its opinion, the Court explained how manufacturers can use
RPM to induce retailers to provide optimal point-of-sale services and
reduce free riding.1 18 It also noted that RPM can stimulate interbrand
competition by reducing intrabrand competition.'1 9 It stated that "[a]
single manufacturer's use of [an RPM policy] tends to eliminate
intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers to
invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that aid
' 20
the manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers."'
The Court also discussed how RPM can produce
anticompetitive effects.1 2 1 In particular, the Court explained how
RPM agreements may be used by a manufacturer or retailer cartel,
and how a dominant retailer may use those agreements to forestall
innovation in the distribution channel. 22 The Court suggested that
several factors are relevant when applying the rule of reason to RPM
policies. 123
Specifically, the Court noted that the number of

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2714.
Id.

116.

Id. at 2713 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723

(1988)).
117.
Id. (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 43 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)).
118.
Id. at 2715-17.
119.
Id. at 2715.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 2717.
122.
Id. at 2716-17 (explaining how a dominant retailer could use resale price
maintenance to forestall competition by making it hard for lower priced rivals to gain
market share).
123.
Id. at 2719.
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manufacturers implementing these policies is relevant to an analysis
of whether a particular agreement is illegal because this may help
courts determine whether an RPM policy is being used to support a
manufacturer or retailer cartel. 124 The Court also emphasized the
importance of determining whether a retailer or manufacturer
imposed the policy. 125 According to Justice Kennedy, there is more
reason to be suspect of an RPM agreement if a retailer wanted it in
effect. 126 Lastly, the Court stated that market power of the proponent
of the agreement is a relevant concern, because without market power
it is unlikely that an RPM policy could be used by either a
127
manufacturer or retailer for anticompetitive purposes.
The primary argument against overruling Dr. Miles, and the
argument raised by Justice Breyer in the dissent, was
salient
most
that Dr. Miles should remain good law because of the judicial principle
of stare decisis.128 However, the majority argued that stare-decisis
concerns were not as significant in antitrust cases because the Court
has traditionally treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute,
and "[j]ust as the common law adapts to modern understanding and
greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibitions on
'restraint[s] of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic
conditions."129
In unequivocal language, the Supreme Court overruled Dr.
Miles and held that RPM agreements were no longer per se illegal but
would be judged under the rule of reason. 30 Importantly, the Court
did not specify how the rule of reason should apply in cases of RPM
agreements, instead stating that "[a]s courts gain experience
considering the effects of [RPM agreements] by applying the rule of
reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation
structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive
restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to
13 1
businesses."'

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
decisions"
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2719-20.
Id. at 2731 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "untold numbers of business
had been made in reliance on Dr. Miles).
Id. at 2720.
Id. at 2725.
Id. at 2720.
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II. A BETTER APPROACH: WHY COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER INTERTYPE

COMPETITION WHEN APPLYING THE RULE OF REASON TO MINIMUM
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AGREEMENTS
The Supreme Court was correct to overrule Dr. Miles and hold
that the rule of reason should apply to RPM agreements because in
many circumstances such agreements can produce procompetitive
effects. However, the Court should have instructed lower courts to
consider intertype competition when applying the rule of reason to
these agreements. Courts applying the rule of reason will likely only
consider how an RPM agreement affects interbrand and intrabrand
competition. 132 These definitions, however, fail to adequately account
for competition between different types of firms competing in different
distribution channels.
The Supreme Court should have instructed lower courts to also
consider intertype competition as a factor when evaluating RPM
agreements under the rule of reason for two specific reasons. First,
the Internet has invigorated intertype competition, making it a more
robust competitive force. Resale price maintenance agreements have
the potential to hinder intertype competition. Second, assumptions
about how firms behave in response to these agreements do not
always apply when online retailers exist in the market place. The
presence of online retailers makes it harder to determine, using the
traditional justifications for RPM agreements, whether a particular
Moreover, the terms
agreement is detrimental to competition.
"interbrand" and "intrabrand" fail to describe changes in the
marketplace brought about by the Internet. By also considering
intertype competition, courts will more accurately be able to assess the
competitive impact of RPM agreements.
III. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED LOWER COURTS
TO CONSIDER INTERTYPE COMPETITION

Intertype competition is competition that is created by the
presence of different types of firms in the marketplace. 33 "For
example, over the past century, each of the following retailing
methods has flourished, in some cases only to be supplanted by more

132.
See id. at 2715 ("The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to
those for other vertical restraints. Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate
interbrand competition ... by reducing intrabrand competition .... ). The Court also listed

several other factors that courts should consider when applying the rule of reason to resale
price maintenance agreements. Id. at 2719.

133.

Miller, Reardon & McCorkle, supra note 7, at 107.
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efficient methods: the department store, mail order catalogues . . ..
the specialty boutique, the drive-in, the supermarket, the specialty
discount store, the warehouse discount store"-and now the online

retailer.

134

A. The Internet has Invigorated Intertype Competition
The Internet has changed the business environment by making
it possible for an entirely new type of retailer-the Internet retailerto enter the market and compete with traditional retailers. 135 Retail
sales online have grown at a precipitous rate, increasing by more than
25 percent from 2001 to 2006.136 In comparison, over the same period,
total retail sales increased by only 4.8 percent. 137 In 2006 e-commerce
accounted for upwards of $107 billion in the United States. 138 The
Internet invigorates intertype competition by increasing price
competition, 139 easing access to goods and services, 140 and providing
consumers with a unique shopping experience and an alternative
141
means to purchase products.
The Internet often increases price competition among firms
because in many instances prices online are lower than prices at
traditional retailers. 42 Prices may be lower online because Internet
retailers often have lower total costs. 143 Moreover, online retailers'
costs are largely fixed as opposed to variable. 144 The Internet also
makes it easier for firms to enter markets since Internet retailers can

134.
135.

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 302-03.
See Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 41 (discussing how shoppers who

shop online experience "convenience, informativeness" and value the "freedom and control"
they experience shopping online); see also Note, supra note 4, at 1610-19 (noting how the
Internet has changed competition in several ways).
136.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 9, at 3.

137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
See Note, supra note 4, at 1612-13.
140.
See Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6,at 42.
141.
See id. at 41 (listing several reasons why consumers shop online).
142.
See Note, supra note 4, at 1612-13 (noting that "[p]rices at purely online
retailers tend to be lower than Internet prices available at retailers using a combination of
online and brick-and-mortar sales," and noting that the Internet makes price competition
more "salient"); see also Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, Frictionless Commerce? A
Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers, 46-4 MGMT. SCI. 563, 563 (2000)
(finding prices of books and CDs on the Internet are 9-16% lower than prices at
conventional retailers).
143.
Note, supra note 4, at 1614 ("[T]otal cost[s] for an online retailer may be lower
because there is no need to invest in a physical storefront.").
144.
Id.
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challenge local monopolies by providing customers with an alternative
145
means of purchasing products.
The Internet also increases price competition because
46
customers can more easily compare prices among firms online.'
Consumers often find information on products or services more readily
available online, "information that previous to the Internet was either
effortful or impossible to find."'1 47 Similarly, consumers' search costs
are often lower online because they can search and compare products
with a few clicks of a mouse. 148 The Internet also represents a unique
Consumers
buying experience that creates value for consumers.
149 and without the
from
home
can
do
so
making a purchase online
hassle of dealing with sales people. 150 For instance, many consumers
feel less "committed" to making a purchase online and derive value
from this facet of online shopping. 5 1 Consumers who shop online
often have different objectives' 52-while some are goal-oriented (for
15
example, shopping online for convenience), others do so for fun. 3
Indeed, some consumers value the experience and fun of shopping
54
online more than they value actually purchasing a product.
Examples of Internet retailers creating intertype competition can be

Id. at 1618; see Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 41. Wolfinbarger and
145.
Gilly provide sample quotes from consumers as to why they shop online. Id. One in
particular states, "I live in a very rural area. Other than a Wal-Mart and Kmart, my
selection of physical stores is fairly limited. [I] have to drive over an hour to get to anything
that resembles a real store." Id. Another stated, "Online is the world's stores in your face."
Id.
Note, supra note 4, at 1612 (noting the "ease of price comparison on the
146.
Internet").
147.
Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 43.
Id. at 42 ("[W]eb-based purchasing is the ultimate in time savings, effort
148.
savings, and accessibility.").
149.
Id.
Id. at 45 ("[Sjalespeople are often perceived to be unhelpful or uninformed and.
150.
they pressure or obligate buyers. Online buyers revel in the fact that they can avoid
sales workers online.").
Id. at 39-40.
151.
See id. at 36 (describing and comparing two groups of online shoppers, those
152.
who are goal-directed and those who shop online for the experience). Compare id. at 41
tbl.4 (describing characteristics associated with goal-oriented shoppers), with id. at 47 tbl.6
(describing the characteristics associated with experiential shopping).
153.
See id. at 46-48 (describing customers who shop online for fun); Id. at 47 tbl.6
(describing the characteristics associated with experiential shopping).
154.
Id. at 36.
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found in industries as diverse as books, 155 compact discs, 156 used
cars,1 57 cigarettes, 158 and contact lenses. 159
B. Resale Price Maintenance Can Inhibit Intertype Competition
Resale price maintenance policies can harm intertype
competition by making Internet retailers less competitive. These
policies eliminate price competition among retailers selling the same
brand. 160 If online retailers compete with traditional retailers by
offering lower prices, RPM agreements can make online retailers less
competitive.' 6' This reduces intertype competition.
Resale price maintenance policies can also make it more
difficult for online retailers to enter markets and obtain market share
by offering lower prices. 62 However, "[p]reserving entry opportunities
for new retailers and new retailing approaches is a critical component
to the dynamic growth of [the] economy." 163 With an RPM agreement
in place, Internet retailers may be deterred from entering the market
because they cannot undercut the prices of incumbent firms, a move
which is likely to be necessary to gain market share. 164 Not
surprisingly, the ability to discount products in order to draw
consumers is one of the new entrant's "most potent competitive

155.
See Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra note 142, at 563.
156.
Id.
157.
Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Risso, Internet Car
Retailing, 49-4 J. INDUS. ECON. 501, 501 (2001) (discussing the sales on used cars online).
158.
John H. Knowles, Jr., Kay L. Wanke & Ichiro Kawachi, Internet Sales of
Tobacco: Heading off the New E-pidemic, 25-2 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 162 (2004).
159.
James C. Cooper, Prices and Price Dispersion in Online and Offline Markets for
Contact Lenses 2 (FTC Bureau of Econ., Working Paper No. 283, 2006).
160.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007)
(noting that vertical price restraints-for example, resale price maintenance-tend to
eliminate intrabrand price competition); see SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 315
("[D]istribution restraints surely do raise consumer prices in most instances.").
161.
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 314-15.
162.
See id. at 303 (stating that the ability to discount items to draw consumers is
"one of the new entrant's most potent competitive tools"). Resale price maintenance policies
prevent retailers, including potential entrants, from reducing prices. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-27 (defining resale-price agreements as agreements that require
retailers to charge a specific price).
163.
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 303.
164.
See id. (noting that intrabrand competition preserves a new entrant's ability to
enter markets and charge a lower price); Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715 (stating that resale
price agreements reduce intrabrand competition).
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tools." 165 In some cases, dominant traditional retailers could abuse
166
RPM policies to deter entry by Internet retailers.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court warned in Leegin, a dominant
retailer could use an RPM policy to forestall innovation. 167 For
example, a dominant retailer might use its buying power to coerce
manufacturers to enter into RPM agreements that would set prices so
high that lower-cost competitors, like Internet retailers, would not be
able to enter the market and challenge its position. 168 In many cases,
however, this will require that the retailer possess market power.169
The unique features of online retailing and the Internet make
it more difficult to evaluate the competitive effects of RPM
agreements. The traditional justifications for RPM agreements are
that they induce retailers to provide point-of-sale services, which
increase demand, and that they can eliminate free riding. 170 The
Supreme Court relied primarily on these justifications in Leegin when
it concluded that resale price agreements should be judged under the
to
rule of reason.1 7 1 Courts applying the rule of reason will likely look 172
agreements.
RPM
evaluating
when
these traditional justifications
to RPM agreements
Online retailers, however, may react differently
1 73
than the standard justifications indicate.
The fact that commercial transactions are occurring on the
Internet also makes it harder for courts to determine whether free
riding is taking place.1 74 The reality of online retailing does not
necessarily invalidate the traditional justifications supporting RPM,
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 5, at 303.
165.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717 ("[A] dominant retailer ... might request resale price
166.
maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs."); Note, supra note
4, at 1619 ("[Blusinesses are more likely to want to use [resale price maintenance
).
agreements] given the Internet ....
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717.
167.
168.
See id.
Id. at 2720 (noting that it is not a serious concern if a dominant retailer abuses
169.
resale price maintenance if the retailer does not have market power).
See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450-56 (discussing the
170.
free-rider problem and also offering some other reasons why resale price maintenance is
used); LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381 (discussing why resale price maintenance can be
economically efficient).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (describing the procompetitive benefits of resale
171.
price maintenance). Resale price maintenance can also be used by a burgeoning
manufacturer who seeks to enter a market by encouraging retailers to carry its brands. Id.
at 2716.
See id. at 2715-17 (explaining how resale price maintenance can create
172.
procompetitive benefits such as eliminating free riding and encouraging retailers to provide
point-of-sale services).
See infra text accompanying notes 175-92.
173.
174.
See infra text accompanying notes 193-98.
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but it does make analyzing these types of agreements more
complicated. In order to improve their analysis of RPM agreements,
the Supreme Court should have instructed lower courts to consider
intertype competition when applying the rule of reason.
1. Firms Selling Online May Not Respond to a Resale Price
Maintenance Agreement by Improving Point-of-Sale Services
One of the traditional justifications supporting RPM is that by
eliminating price competition, retailers will compete among one
another by offering better point-of-sale services to promote the same
product. 175
Online retailers, though, may not respond to RPM
agreements by offering better point-of-sale services for two reasons:
physical limitations and customer preferences. 176 The traditional
argument that RPM agreements can increase point-of-sale services
fails to take into account the fact that a firm selling online, in many
cases, cannot possibly offer the same point-of-sale services as a brickand-mortar firm. And even if it could, customers who buy online may
not value point-of-sale services enough to offset the price increase
caused by the RPM agreement. 177 Thus, RPM agreements may
increase prices without inducing the positive effect of stimulating
point-of-sale competition among Internet retailers.
In many instances, online sellers cannot offer the same pointof-sale services as brick-and-mortar firms because of physical
limitations.1 78 In such a situation, an RPM agreement may lead
online sellers to charge higher prices with no corresponding increase
in demand for a product. 179 Without an increase in demand, the RPM

175.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715-16; see LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 380-82
(explaining how resale price maintenance induces retailers to provide these services).
176.
See infra text accompanying notes 183-85.
177.
See infra text accompanying notes 181-92.
178.
An online retailer would not be able to hire a friendly and knowledgeable sales
staff in order to help sell products in the same way that, say, a used car dealer could do so.
Generally, online sales people do not meet face-to-face with customers and usually only
speak with customers when customers have a customer-service question. See, e.g.,
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 252-53 (1985) (using an

auto dealership as an example of how sales staff works to help sell products) [hereinafter
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS]. But see Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 45-46 (discussing

how email assistance and call centers can provide a way for customers to speak to sales
people). Note that an RPM agreement could be used by a high-end manufacturer to ensure
that its image as a luxury brand is not eroded by lower-priced retailers selling its products.
See Note, supra note 4, at 1611 (discussing how brand image is one way that firms may try
to differentiate themselves). The foregoing arguments do not apply to such a situation.
179.
LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381 exhibit 11.4 (illustrating the need for the
demand curve to shift up in response to a resale price maintenance agreement). If demand
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agreement will cause online retailers to lose sales. 8 0 This effect
harms intertype competition.
For instance, suppose a manufacturer implements an RPM
policy that raises prices by 10 percent. The traditional justification for
an RPM agreement indicates that firms will increase point-of-sale
services, which will in turn boost demand.' 8 ' A conventional retailer
might improve point-of-sale services by, for example, hiring friendlier
and more knowledgeable sales staff or creating new product
displays. 8 2 In order for demand to increase, consumers must value
83
these point-of-sale services.
Because a firm selling online does not have a physical
storefront, it may not be able to offer similar point-of-sale services. As
a result, an Internet retailer may have to look for other ways to
improve point-of-sale services in order to spark customer demand.
Perhaps it could improve its website design or lengthen its warranty
program. 8 4 Whether customers value these services enough to justify
the increase in price would depend on the particular product and
85
customer.
In some circumstances, customers who buy online may not
value point-of sale services enough to justify an increase in the price of
a product. 8 6 Consumers in the online marketplace often have
different preferences and goals than consumers purchasing from
does not increase, then sales will decrease as a result of the higher price under the resale
price maintenance agreement. Id.

Id.
180.
181.
Id. (illustrating and describing how demand increases as a result of the pointof-sale services provided); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705, 2715 (stating that resale price maintenance "encourages retailers to invest in
tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts").
See HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS, supra note 178, at 252-53 (using car sales as an
182.
example of how sales staff help make sales).
LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381 exhibit 11.4 (showing that point-of-sale
183.
service must increase demand to justify the additional costs that retailers must incur to
provide these services). The cost that retailers will incur to provide point-of-sale services
equals the difference between marginal cost and the price set by the resale price
maintenance policy. Id.
184.
There are many ways in which an Internet retailer could provide better pointof-sale services. See iTunes Store - Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/lTunesStore#
(last visited Jan. 19, 2008) (describing numerous promotional activities undertaken by
iTunes).
185.
See LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 381 exhibit 11.4 (illustrating how demand
increases by an amount, V, which is the value consumers place on the additional point-ofsale services).
Id. If consumers do not value the additional services then demand will not
186.
increase and sales will decrease. Id.; see also Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 44-45
(explaining some of the reasons that consumers often prefer to shop online, including better
information and the ability to avoid sales people).
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traditional retailers.18 7 Consumers who purchase online often place
value on the unique attributes of using the Internet to make
purchases.1 88 Because consumers who purchase online may have
different preferences and goals, a retailer who sells online likely faces
a different demand curve than its brick-and-mortar counterpart
selling the same product.18 9 Because Internet retailers often face a
different demand curve, it is unclear whether demand would expand
enough in response to better point-of-sale services to offset the
increase in price. 190 The traditional rationale for an RPM agreement
assumes that retailers face essentially the same demand curve, which
reacts in response to the additional or improved point-of-sale
services. 191 Therefore, an RPM policy that applies to Internet retailers
may not benefit online consumers since they may not value an
improvement in point-of-sale services as much as consumers shopping
1 92
at conventional retail outlets.

187.
Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 36 tbl.1 (summarizing reasons why
consumers shop online, including accessibility, information availability, fun, and lack or
presence of sociality). Consumers also choose to shop online because they feel less
committed to making a purchase. Id. at 39.
188.
See id. at 38-40 (explaining that some online shoppers are goal-oriented and
enjoy the increased freedom and control they achieve online); id. at 40 tbl.3 (illustrating
quotes taken from a focus group of online shoppers, including statements such as, 'You can
sit on your arse and eat while you shop. You can even shop naked!" and 'You haven't
driven over there and parked and walked around so you have a little more flexibility and
can get around a lot faster"). Many consumers value the experience of shopping online. Id.
at 46-48.
189.
Some customers place a value on channel location, which means that some may
prefer to purchase online, while others may still prefer to purchase in brick-and-mortar
stores. See Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 41 tbl.4 (describing why some consumers
chose to purchase online).
190.
See LANDSBURG, supra note 74, at 4 ("[A] change in anything other than price
can lead to a change in demand") (emphasis omitted); id. at 381 exhibit 11.4 (illustrating
that demand increases by the amount by which consumers value the additional services
provided). Products online and offline are in essence substitutes for one another. See id. at
109.
191.
See id. at 381 exhibit 11.4 (assuming that the demand curves facing retailers
who sell the product are essentially the same).
192.
Some shoppers are goal-oriented, and may simply be uninterested in fancy
websites or product promotions. Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 41 tbl.4. It is
important to note that in many cases a manufacturer would be interested in how a resale
price maintenance policy affects Internet retailers who distribute its products. If online
retailers lose sales, the manufacturer also loses sales. However, because customer
preferences differ across channels, Internet retailers could lose sales to brick-and-mortar
stores, leaving manufacturers no worse off.
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2. The Internet Makes it More Difficult to Determine Whether Free
Riding is Taking Place
Another traditional justification for an RPM policy is that
manufacturers can use the agreements to prevent free riding by
competing retailers. 193 This justification also fails to take into account
the changes brought about by the Internet distribution channel. The
Internet may make it easier for firms to free ride.194 But the Internet
may also make it more difficult for courts to differentiate between free
riding and legitimate competition because online firms may cater to
the tastes of customers with different preferences, even while selling
the same product as their brick-and-mortar counterparts. 195 If an
online retailer is selling at a lower price, it does not necessarily mean
that it is free riding on the point-of-sale services provided by brickand-mortar firms. 196 An online retailer may serve a distinct market of
customers who do not visit traditional retailers in order to take
advantage of the traditional retailers' point-of-sale services. 197 For
instance, a consumer purchasing music may have no reason to travel
to a traditional retailer to learn about a particular artist or title; he or
she may simply prefer to learn about the music and listen to sample
tracks online.1 98 Therefore, the Internet creates difficulties for courts
attempting to discern whether free riding is taking place because
Internet retailers may actually be serving distinct markets.
3. Intertype Competition Better Defines the Changes
Brought About by the Internet Distribution Channel
In Leegin, the Supreme Court focused on the traditional
justifications for RPM, such as its ability to induce retailers to provide

193.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 271516 (2007) (describing what free riding is and explaining how resale price maintenance can
eliminate free riding); HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST, supra note 71, at 450-53.
194.
Note, supra note 4, at 1615 (discussing free riding among different retailing
channels).
195.
See infra text accompanying notes 197-98 (discussing how consumers in
different channels often have different preferences).
196.
Note, supra note 4, at 1616 (noting that one out of four people who bought
online may have been free riders on the services provided by brick-and-mortar retailers).
197.
See Wolfinbarger & Gilly, supra note 6, at 41 (describing all of the reasons that
goal-oriented shoppers purchased online).
198.
See, e.g., iTunes Store - Wikipedia, supra note 184 (noting that users can
preview songs for thirty seconds and TV and video for ninety seconds); accord Wolfinbarger
& Gilly, supra note 6, at 43-44 (explaining how many consumers shop online because they
find information on products and price more plentiful).
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better point-of-sale services and reduce free riding. 199
These
traditional justifications are centered on the premise that because
RPM policies increase interbrand competition, while decreasing
intrabrand competition, they are good for consumers. 200 Courts will
likely look to these traditional justifications when applying the rule of
20 1
reason to RPM agreements.
The terms "interbrand" and "intrabrand" competition, however,
do not describe the features of the modern marketplace brought about
by the Internet distribution channel. By focusing on RPM agreements
solely through the lens of intrabrand and interbrand competition,
courts may not adequately consider the changes resulting from the
development and growth of online retailing. Interbrand competitionthe competition between firms selling different brands but similar
products-does not adequately describe firms who are selling the same
20 2
brand in different distribution channels, such as the Internet.
Intrabrand competition-generally describes vertical competition
between firms in the same distribution channel selling the same
brand-comes closer, but fails to encompass the extent to which
different demand curves may accompany the same physical products
in different distribution channels. 20 3 The term "intertype competition"
better defines the competition between different types of firms as well
as firms selling the same brand in different channels. With Internet
retailers, this difference is the result of selling products online, which
represents a substantially different means of selling products than
traditional brick-and-mortar firms.
The Supreme Court should have instructed lower courts to
consider the effects that RPM agreements have on intertype
competition. The market place has changed substantially as a result
of the Internet, and the Internet has invigorated intertype
competition. 20 4 Each year billions of dollars of merchandise is sold
online. 20 5 Resale price maintenance agreements can harm intertype
competition, and as a result intertype competition is worthy of a
court's consideration when determining whether an RPM agreement is

199.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-16
(2007).
200.
Id. at 2715.
201.
See id. at 2715-17 (discussing how resale price maintenance can create
procompetitive effects).
202.
See GAVIL, KOVAcIc & BAKER, supra note 17, at 342 fig.4-3 (illustrating
interbrand competition).
203.
Id. at 341 fig.4-2 (explaining the definition of intrabrand competition).
204.
See supra text accompanying notes 135-59.
205.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
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illegal in any particular case. 20 6 Moreover, the standard justifications
for RPM agreements-that these agreements increases point-of-sale
services and can prevent free riding-fail to take into account the
Internet distribution channel. 20 7
If courts considered intertype
competition, it is less likely that they would overlook the harmful and
anticompetitive effects that RPM agreements may have on Internet
retailers.
Although the Supreme Court did not instruct lower courts to
consider intertype competition in their analyses of the illegality of
RPM agreements under the Sherman Act, the Court did provide some
relevant factors for lower courts to consider, which will in many
instances prevent substantial harm to intertype competition. 20 8 One
relevant factor is whether a large portion of manufacturers use RPM
policies because it is unlikely that RPM is being used to support a
cartel if only a few manufacturers have RPM policies. 20 9 The Court
also instructed lower courts to consider whether a manufacturer or a
retailer was the impetus behind such an agreement since there is
more reason to be concerned that anticompetitive conduct is occurring
if retailers are supporting such a policy. 210 Furthermore, the Court
stated that unless a manufacturer or retailer has market power it is
unlikely that an RPM policy is being abused for anticompetitive
purposes. 2 11 In many cases, these factors should help the lower courts
prevent RPM agreements from being used to produce anticompetitive
effects.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have instructed lower
courts to consider intertype competition so that courts will focus on
the effects that RPM agreements have on Internet retailers. The
21 2
purpose of antitrust law is to protect competition, not competitors.
On an individual level, Internet retailers are simply competitors. But
en masse, Internet retailers create intertype competition, which is
worthy of the courts' consideration when evaluating competition in the
marketplace. Therefore, by considering intertype competition as a
distinct form of competition that is worthy of protection under the rule
of reason, courts would more accurately assess the competitive effects
that RPM agreements have on competition generally.
206.
207.
208.
(2007).

See supra text accompanying notes 160-74.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-98.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2719-20

209.
210.

Id.
Id.

211.
212.

Id. at 2720.
Id. at 2724.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have instructed lower courts to
consider intertype competition in addition to interbrand and
intrabrand competition when evaluating RPM agreements under the
rule of reason. The Internet has invigorated intertype competition
and made it an important competitive force in the economy. Resale
price maintenance agreements have the potential to harm intertype
competition. Moreover, the growth of online retailing has challenged
the traditional justifications that support RPM policies.
Online
retailers may not react to an RPM agreement in the same way as
traditional retailers, and the existence of online retailers now makes it
more difficult for courts to determine whether an RPM agreement may
be necessary for a manufacturer to prevent free riding. Courts should
consider intertype competition when applying the rule of reason to
resale price agreements to more accurately and fairly assess the
competitive effects of these agreements.
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